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BOOK REVIEWS
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF THE EUROPEAN COmmUNITiES. By Gerhard Bebr;*

London: Stevens & Son Ltd., New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962.

Pp. 268. $10.00.
While the political and economic activities of the European Common
Market have received a great deal of publicity in this country, the same is unfortunately not true of the judicial branch of the European Communities. Thus,
many American lawyers are surprised to learn that the Court of Justice of the
European Communities, since its establishment in 1952, has decided over 10d
cases. 1 These range from actions instituted by Community institutions and
private parties charging Member States with illegal activities, 2 through damage
suits by importers against Community institutions,3 to applications for preliminary adjudication of antitrust disputes arising before domestic tribunals. 4
The jurisdiction of this Court, created first as the judicial branch of the
European Coal and Steel Community, 5 was extended in 1958 to encompass the
European Economic Community, popularly known as the European Common
Market, and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom).6 In its
composition, this Court is international in nature, consisting of seven judges
selected for a six-year term by the governments of the six Member States
((acting in common agreement." 7 The official languages of the Court are
French, Italian, German and Dutch.8
The function of the Court, broadly speaking, is to ensure the rule of law in
* Legal Adviser, Legal Services of the European Communities.
1. Here it might be noted that the Permanent Court of International Justice during
its 24 year existence decided only 58 cases, consisting of 26 advisory opinions and 32
decisions.
2. See Commission of the European Economic Community v. Italy, Case No. 7-61, 7
Sammlung der Rechtsprechung des Gerichtshofes [hereinafter cited as Sammlung] 693
(1961), deciding that Italy had violated the EEC Treaty by unilaterally suspending
the importation of pork from other Member States; Humblet v. Belgium, Case No. 6-60,
6 Sammlung 1163 (1960), tax imposed by Belgium on Community official of Belgian
nationality held to be inconsistent with Belgium's obligations under the Treaty.
3. Soci&t6 Commerciale Antoine Vloeberghs v. High Authority, Joint Cases No. 9 and
12-60, 7 Sammlung 427 (1961) (involving American anthracite coal).
4. De Geus v. Robert Bosch GmbH, Case No. 13-61, 8 Sammlung 97 (1962).
5. The Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community was signed in
Paris on April 18, 1951, and entered into force on July 23, 1952.
6. The Treaties establishing the European Economic Community and the European
Atomic Energy Community were signed in Rome on March 25, 1957, and entered into
force on January 1, 1958.
On October 7, 1958, pursuant to Sec. II, Arts. 3 and 4 of the Convention relating t
certain Institutions comnmon to tle European Communities, the Court of Justice of the
European Communities formally replaced the Court of Justice of the ECSC continuing,
however, to exercise the functions of its predecessor under the ECSC Treaty.
7. At present, the Court consists of two Italian judges, while France, Germany,
Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg are represented by one judge each.
8. The plaintiff generally has the choice of languages except that, if the action is
instituted by a Community institutution against a Member State or a private party, proceedings will be in the language of these defendants. Rules of Procedure, Art. 29 (1959):
In other words, the Community institutions are presumed to speak all four languages.
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the interpretation and application of the provisions of the three Treaties establishing the European Communities. Since these Treaties seek to achieve different
economic objectives, the law which the Court has to administer in discharging
its function as the guardian of Community legality differs depending upon the
particular Treaty under which a given controversy arises. An analysis of the
Court's role may thus be approached in two ways. It could be limited to one
of the three Treaties9 or it could attempt a comparative study of the Court's
function under all three Treaties. The latter method is more difficult and as
yet somewhat conjectural, because at present the great bulk of the Court's
jurisprudence stems from the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel
Community. It is, however, more useful, because it permits the presentation of
a comprehensive view of the judicial structure of the Communities. This is the
task the monograph under review seeks to perform. And, while I sometimes
disagree with its author's conclusions, it should be said at the outset that Dr.
Bebr succeeds admirably in presenting in this book a most comprehensive and
systematic study of the jurisdictional framework within which the Community
Court operates.
To Dr. Bebr the "supreme function of the Court" is to keep the "dynamic
political interactions of the Community organs within the framework of the
Treaties and channel them towards the proclaimed Community objectives"
(p. 20). The awareness that the discharge of this function is a monumental task
comparable to that of our own Supreme Court comes only with the realization
that the Community Court's jurisdiction in some instances is superimposed upon
or concurrent with the jurisdiction of the national judicial tribunals of the six
Member States; that in other instances it is exclusive; and that the characterization of the nature of this jurisdiction is not .uniform in the three Treaties.
Dr. Bebr approaches this jurisdictional labyrinth by dividing his study into
three major parts, devoting the first to an introductory survey of the role of the
Court in the structure of the European Communities; the second to "Direct
Judicial Control," wherein he analyzes the judicial safeguards provided for by
the Treaties against the powers granted to the various Community organs; and
the third to "Indirect Judicial Controls," dealing primarily with the jurisdictional and substantive relation between Community and municipal law.
I. TE STRUCTURE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
Since an understanding of the economic policy and institutional framework of the Communities is a prerequisite to any meaningful discussion of the
Court's function, Dr. Bebr sets the stage by outlining their objectives and institutional contours:
9. For the EEC Treaty, see the excellent article by Stein and Hay, Legal Remedies
of Enterprises in the European Economic Community, 9 Am. J. Comp. L. 375 (1960). See
also, Daig, Die Gerichtsbarkeit in der E.W.G. und der Europliischen Atom gemeinsehaft,
44 Archly des Uffentlichen Rechts 132 (1958). Both articles contain comparative references

to the ECSC.
For the ECSC Treaty, see Valentine, The Court of Justice of the ECSC (1955).
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Generally expressed, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)
and the European Economic Community (EEC) seek to undo the unfortunate consequences of a national policy of economic autarchy
which disrupted natural economic ties, irrespective of the economic
losses inflicted. .

. In this respect Euratom stands somewhat apart

.

for it is to construct a completely new industry from scratch so that
there are practically no barriers to be torn down (p. 1).
Dr. Bebr then emphasizes a fact which is sometimes overlooked, namely,
that:
The economic objectives of the Communities are similar only as to
their general policy goals. The ECSC and the EEC differ notably not
only in the scope of their competence, but also in their approach and
in the intensity of the efforts by which they seek to transform the
previously separate national economies into one unit. Limited to a
narrow but vital sector of national economy, the ECSC is concentrating its efforts on forming a common and competitive coal and steel
market throughout the Community. The EEC, on the other hand, encompasses practically the entire national economy but-so far as any
comparison is permissible at all-to a less intense degree than the
ECSC. . ; . With a single exception [the prohibition of any discrimination on the grounds of nationality throughout the Community],
the role of the EEC is merely to assure competition in inter-State
trade (pp. 2-3, footnotes omitted).
In form, the institutional structure of the three Communities is similar.
Thus, the EEC and Euratom each have a Commission, an independent Community executive which parallels the High Authority in the ECSC, and in all
three Communities a Council of Ministers represents the interests of the
Member States, while a common Parliamentary Assembly, as yet without any
of the legislative powers which traditionally belong to such bodies, serves the
Communities as a deliberative body.' 0 But, as Dr. Bebr justly indicates:
Although these organs . . . are in their nature and composition simi-

lar, their power prerogatives differ in each of the Communities ...
In the ECSC the power of decision is largely concentrated in the
High Authority .

.

. In most instances the Authority acts entirely

or more or less independently of the Council (pp. 16-17).
This, Dr. Bebr points out, is not true in the EEC and Euratom, which
clothed the Council of Ministers with broad legislative powers to the detriment
of the supranational Commission. He attributes this shift in part at least to the
fact that the Member States, because they delegated such vast powers over
their national economies to the EEC, were unwilling to vest them entirely in
a body over which they can have no real control."
10. The Assembly does have the power, however, to force the resignation of the
Commission in a body. This no-confidence motion requires a two-thirds majority vote. See,
EEC Treaty, Art. 144.
11. Since Dr. Bebr's discussion of the institutional framework of the Communities is
necessarily more in, the nature of a broad survey, the reader might want to consult the
provocative article by Professor Stein entitled The New Institutions, in 1 American Enter-
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II. DIRECT JUDICIAL CONTROL
While space does not permit a detailed analysis of the various legal safeguards embedded in the Treaties and Dr. Bebr's conclusions about them, it
might be useful to deal with some of them briefly in order to gain a perspective
of the subject matter covered in the study under review. All three Treaties
furnish a remedy in the Court against illegal administrative and quasi-legislative acts emanating from the various Community institutions.12 This so-called
appeal for annulment sets in motion a judicial proceeding designed to invalidate
administrative and quasi-legislative measures on any one of the four following
grounds of illegality: lack of jurisdiction, substantial procedural violations,
violation of the Treaty, or abuse of power. Complementing it is a remedy,
somewhat in the nature of our mandamus and declaratory judgment proceedings, under which the Court is empowered to review the failure of one of the
Community institutions to act. 13
But the rules and regulations which the institutions may issue and the
parties who may challenge them differ depending upon whether the appeal for
annulment or against inaction arises under the ECSC Treaty on the one hand,
or the EEC and Euratom Treaties on the other. Thus, the ECSC Treaty provides in Article 14 that the High Authority, in executing the tasks entrusted
to it under the Treaty "shall take decisions, formulate recommendations and
issue opinions." While decisions are binding, opinions are not; recommendations, however, are "binding with respect to the objectives which they specify,"
leaving to those to whom they are directed "the choice of appropriate means
for attaining the objectives." The EEC Treaty, in contrast, stipulates a hierarchy of five acts through which the Council and the Commission are to discharge their functions. These are regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations, and opinions. The last two have no binding effect. Regulations are
measures of general applicability binding in every respect and directly applicable
in each Member State. Directives "bind any Member State to which they are
addressed, as to result to be achieved, while leaving to domestic agencies a
competence [discretion] as to form and means." Finally, decisions are "binding
14
in every respect for the addressees named therein.'
Under the EEC Treaty only Member States, the Council or the Commission may seek the annulment of regulations, directives and decisions, while a
private party has this right only with regard to decisions addressed to him or
decisions addressed to others but being of "direct and specific concern to him."'u
prise in the European Common Market: A Legal Profile 33 (Stein & Nicholson eds. 1960),
which the author fails to cite.
12. ECSC Treaty, Art. 33; EEC Treaty, Art. 173; Euratom Treaty, Art 146.
13. In the ECSC, this remedy resembles our mandamus proceeding. ECSC Treaty,
Art. 35. See generally, Buergenthal, The Private Appeal Against Illegal State Activities il
the ECSC, 11 Am. J. Comp. L. 325 (1962). The corresponding remedy under the EEC

Treaty is more in the nature of a declaratory judgment proceeding. See, EEC Treaty, Art.
175; Daig, supra note 9, at 178.
14. EEC Treaty, Art. 189.
15. EEC Treaty, Art. 173.
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Private parties subject to the jurisdiction of the ECSC, while they may seek the
annulment of decisions and recommendations promulgated by the High Authority, are restricted, as distinguished from Member States and the Council,
in the grounds of illegality that they may advance against these administrative
measures. This limitation is accomplished by a provision in Article 33(2) of
the ECSC Treaty, which distinguishes between general and individual decisions
and recommendations, giving private parties the right to challenge only such
general decisions and recommendations "which they deem to involve an abuse
of power affecting them," while permitting them to appeal individual acts on
all four grounds of illegality. Thus, unless a general act is vitiated by abuse of
power,'( it is not subject to an appeal for annulment instituted by a private
party. Since neither Treaty defines these acts, the Court's powers are substantial. In characterizing the type or nature of a Community measure and in
formulating the criteria necessary to make out an abuse of power, the Court
can either limit or extend the judicial protection afforded private parties against
illegal Community acts.
How has the Court approached this task? After analyzing its opinions,
Dr. Bebr concludes:
The . ..trend clearly discernible in the judicial policy of the Court
is the extension of the judicial protection of private parties. To attain
this end the Court has broadly interpreted the notion of individual
acts-and to a lesser degree the grounds of illegality. One aspect of this
policy is the tendency of the Court to interpret ditournement de pouvoir [abuse of power] in some instances in a manner very close to a
Treaty violation, so as to widen the right of appeal of private parties
against general acts. There is, however, an evident reticence on the part
of the Court to interpret ditournement de pouvoir too liberally, particularly in instances of appeals against general acts having quasilegislative character. This attitude may be explained by the far-reaching
consequences which may result from their annulment. To compensate
for the limited right of appeal of private parties, the Court has extended an exception of illegality beyond the intended purpose and
elevated it to a general principle, thus providing a highly individual
protection against the concrete application of a general act (p. 241).
One might wish that the trend Dr. Bebr seems to discern were fully substantiated by the case law. It is, of course, true that by interpreting the "exception of illegality"'17 remedy so as to permit private litigants seeking the annul16. In French law an administrative act is said to be vitiated by abuse of power
(ditournement de pouvoir) if the administrator, while complying with all objective
requirements of the law, acted in the pursuit of ends different than those for which the
power was delegated to him.
In the European Communities the concept of abuse of power has a somewhat wider
meaning: it encompasses a situation where an institution 'in
exercising its powers, is guided
by illegal motives or negligently pursues ends different than those for which the particular
powers were granted. Advocate-General Roemer, Case No. 18-57, 5 Sammlung 119, 147
(1958-59).
17. The remedy of an "exception of illegality" permits a private party charged with
a violation of an administrative or legislative enactment to challenge its legality in an action
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ment of individual decisions to attack the legality of the underlying general act,
the Court has extended their judicial protection. But this cannot, in my opinion,
be said with regard to the other examples cited by the author. I have shown
elsewhere' 8 that the Court's jurisprudence does not support Dr. Bebr's conclusion that "the Court has so far interpreted an individual act rather liberally
to the detriment of a general act so as to ensure the widest possible judicial
protection of individuals" (p. 42). I wonder, furthermore, whether Dr. Bebr's
excellent analysis of some of the cases, which he cites apparently to substantiate
his conclusion (pp. 42-48), does not invite a contrary conclusion? Dr. Bebr's
view that the Court in interpreting the notion of an abuse of power, has widened
"the right of appeal of private parties against general acts" is debatable.10
I know of no case, and the author cites none, wherein the Court has annulled
a general act in an action instituted by a private party on the ground of abuse
of power. 20 Be that as it may, the Court's liberal policy of permitting private
parties to invoke an exception of illegality does to a large extent compensate
for what, in my opinion, has been a restrictive interpretation of the right of
individuals to challenge general acts.
III.

INDIRECT JUDICIAL CONTROL

The third part of this book contains probably the most comprehensive and
searching analysis of the myriad problems of conflict of laws and conflict of
jurisdiction arising under the three Treaties to be found in the Anglo-American
literature. To note only one of them here, we might refer to Article 177 of the
EEC Treaty which provides:
The Court of Justice shall be competent to make a preliminary decision
concerning:
(a) the interpretation of this Treaty;
(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of
the Community; and
(c) the interpretation of the statutes of any bodies set up by an
act of the Council, where such statutes so provide.
Where any such question is raised before a court or tribunal of
one of the Member States, such court or tribunal may, if it considers
that its judgment depends on a preliminary decision on this question,
request the Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon.
Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a
to set aside the resulting sanctions. It is an exception, because it may be invoked even
though the time, within which such a measure could otherwise be contested, has already
expired. See ECSC Treaty, Art. 36.
18. Buergenthal, Appeals for Annulment by Enterprises in the ECSC, 10 Am. J.

Comp. L. 227, 247-51 (1961). It might well be that in proceedings under Article 35 of
the ECSC Treaty the Court has been more liberal in its characterization of individual
acts. See De Gezamliike Steenkolenmijnen in Limburg v. High Authority, Case No. 30-59,
7 Sammlung 1 (1961).
19. See Buergenthal, supra at 244-247.

20. See Bonaert et al., Fragen der Nichtigkeits-und Untiitigkeitsklagen nach dem
Recht der EGKS 57 (1961), also indicating that the Court has never annulled a decision
on that ground.
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domestic court or tribunal from whose decisions no appeal lies under
municipal law, such court or tribunal shall refer the matter to the
Court of Justice.
Apart from the fact that it is not always easy in some of the Member States,
particularly Germany, to determine the domestic court of final appellate jurisdiction, neither Article 177 nor any other Treaty provision furnishes a litigant
in a municipal court with a direct method for appealing to the Community
Court from a domestic tribunal's finding that the question before it need not
be submitted to the European Court pursuant to Article 177. That this defect
is by no means insignificant is well demonstrated by Dr. Bebr and the cases
collected in his study. His suggestion that "courts of final appellate jurisdiction
are always and under any circumstances bound to refer a preliminary question
to the Court, whenever they consider a provision of the Community law" (p.
192), seems valid, qualified only by the possible exceptions which he himself
postulates in the succeeding pages of his work. The ideal solution, but one which
could probably not be put into effect without an amendment of the Treaties,
was suggested by Professors Stein and Hay. They proposed "the development
by the Community of a procedure similar to the writ of certiorariin American
law whereby the Community Court on request of a party could direct the
national court of last resort to submit to it the record."12 1 It may be more
apparent to American lawyers, accustomed to dealing with conflicting state and
federal laws, than to their European counterparts, that the absence of a
remedy in the nature of the writ of certiorari cannot but impede the Court's
function as an instrument for the harmonization of law among the six Member
States.
IV. CONCLUSION

The preceding review has, of course, hardly scratched the surface of the
various problems discussed in this book. While one might disagree with some
of Dr. Bebr's conclusions, it should be emphasized that his book is a valuable
contribution to the literature dealing with the Court of justice. From it the
reader gains a lawyer's perspective of the function which the Court performs
as the ultimate arbiter of the rapidly growing Community law. What might
have become a superficial survey under someone else's pen, has been presented
by Dr. Bebr as a thorough analysis of many difficult substantive and intricate
procedural questions confronting the Community Court.
THOMAS BUERGENTTAL

Assistant Professor of Law
State University of New York
at Buffalo
School of Law
21.

Stein & Hay, supranote 9, at 423.

